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The Political Economy of Energy and Its
Implications for Climate Change Legislation
Jim Rossi*
Public choice themes have aisen throughout the history of US energy regulation and
continue to be relevant today, particularty with widespread discussion of deregulation and
increased attention to climate change. This Article surveys how public choice themes are
relevant to understandinga host of issues of importance to the electncpower industry today,
including the structureofthe industry the signiticanceof wholesale markets,and the &vision of
regulatory power between state and federal authorities. The Article highlights how an
unde5tnding of how public choice has contributed to these features of the electric power
industrywill prove importantto the successes andfailures ofnationalclimate changepolicy
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INTRODUCTION

Recent debates about climate change view the energy industry
with regulatory mandates in mind. For example, pending legislation
before Congress has announced carbon targets, ambitious goals for
renewable energy, and subsidies and tax breaks for new technologies.'
This Article argues that US. climate change reforms should not be
approached without placing the regulation of energy within the history
and context of its economic regulation. The extent to which the
interaction between private stakeholders and governmental actors in
energy industries reflects self-interest rather than sound economic
policy was studied by classic scholars of modem public choice
scholarship as early as the 1960s and continues to hold the attention of
economists and political scientists today.
As we approach climate change reform, these issues cannot be
ignored, as they will impact the success of climate change policies. It
is perhaps obvious that environmental regulation of an infrastructureheavy industry, such as electric power, cannot be successful without
some basic attention to economics. However, economic aspects of
electric power and its operation receive little or no attention in debates
surrounding climate change. The history of economic regulation of
electric power helps us to understand why the industry is structured the
way it is, as well as why regulating one aspect of the industry without
paying attention to incentives and broader system impacts of behavior
can thwart, if not undermine altogether, broader regulatory goals.
This Article takes as its starting point the history of public utility
regulation. Certain economic features and legal doctrines that are
commonplace under traditional public utility regulation-the
predominant approach by which many energy resources were price
regulated throughout the twentieth century-may reflect rent seeking
on the part of private stakeholders as much as enlightened public
1.
As of October 2009, there are several pending bills before Congress, addressing
topics that range from cap and trade programs for carbon emissions, renewable portfolio
standards, and expanded federal authority over high-voltage transmission lines. The House of
Representatives has adopted landmark legislation, The American Clean Energy and Security
Act of 2009 (commonly known as the "Waxman-Markey" bill). Waxman-Markey adopts a
national renewable portfolio standard, expands FERC's authority over transmission siting and
planning, and mandates a complex cap and trade system for carbon emissions. H.R. 2454,
111 th Cong. (2009). On the Senate side, The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act
was introduced by Senators Barbara Boxer and John Kerry in fall 2009, but has yet to be
adopted. This bill focuses primarily on carbon cap and trade. Another bill that has been
approved by the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee addresses electric power
renewable goals and expands FERC's authority over transmission planning and siting.
American Clean Energy Leadership Act of 2009, § 1462.
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interest by lawmakers. For example, the preferences of various interest
groups have bolstered the stability of public utility legal doctrines,
such as consumer protection requirements and the judicial reluctance
to extend strong constitutional protections to energy firms. Public
choice approaches also can illuminate the regulatory and institutional
arrangements that have evolved in national energy regulation. Many
energy resources are geographically limited in source and extraction,
yet nationwide in consumption. An interest group approach to
legislation sheds light on why Congress has elected to address some
energy issues at the national level, while ignoring others altogether, or
leaving them to subnational governments. In addition, logrolling,
which has characterized most recent congressional energy legislation,
helps to illustrate how seemingly disparate energy issues have become
connected in national energy policy and how national energy policy
has been largely unsatisfactory and unstable across time. It also
advises caution in reading specific purposes into general energy
legislation.
In addition to understanding the history of regulation, this Article
highlights that national climate change policy must also recognize
developments related to deregulation of the electric power industry.
Recent efforts to privatize and deregulate energy resources have been
celebrated by many as a triumph of markets over regulation. However,
the interest group story surrounding the movement towards new
energy markets is itself heavily dependent on governmental processes
and is subject to the same kind of public choice critique that has been
applied to traditional energy regulation. Competitive restructuring of
energy markets can be understood as motivated by private self-interest
in the political process, rather than as an entirely pro-free market
policy, making public choice insights relevant in new ways. In
addition, as we approach regulation with climate goals in mind,
understanding the political economy of the legal structure that
contributes to constrained transmission capacity is a fundamental
predicate to increased dependency on renewable sources, as well as
new technologies.
Part II addresses public choice foundations for public utility
regulation and how this legal framework contributed to the current
industry structure in electric power. Part III highlights the nature of
federalism in energy, and the dual regulatory structure that continues to
predominate discussions today. It also highlights how national energy
legislation-while undeniably important-historically has been, and
will likely continue to be, oversold as a solution to many regulatory
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problems. Part IV illustrates the political economy implications of
deregulation, highlighting how deregulation itself is a type of public
choice failure, and how public law remains highly relevant in a
deregulated environment. Part V concludes, suggesting that modem
climate change efforts must recognize these political economy
foundations by confronting carbon neutrality in transmission at the
national level; by retaining a substantial sphere for leadership in
climate policy by state and local governments; and by approaching
climate change against the backdrop of wholesale deregulation and the
economic incentives facing private firms in that context, rather than by
relying entirely on outdated regulatory assumptions about the energy
industry.
II.

RENT SEEKING IN STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF ENERGY

AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY SOURCES OF CONSTRAINED
TRANSMISSION

Public choice has been said to embrace a "cynical" perspective
regarding regulation's promise and effectiveness.2 As Martha Derthick
and Paul Quick have observed of twentieth-century regulation
generally,
The predominant view of both economists and political scientists was
that regulation presented a case in which the benefits of government
policy were concentrated in a few well-organized interests-the firms
and unions that were protected from competition-whereas the costs
were widely dispersed among consumers whose incentives to organize
to protect their interests were insufficient to induce political action.3
At its least controversial, this account views governmental regulation
as motivated by private self interest and, at times, ineffective.4 Much
public choice scholarship has emphasized how governmental
regulation of energy reflects rent-seeking behavior by private actors as
well as government officials, in ways that sometimes limit or reduce
aggregate wealth. An extreme strand of this work views regulation as

2.
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE To
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 27 (1997).
3.
MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QuIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 9-10
(1985).
4.
Robert L. Bradley Jr., The Oriins and Development of Electric Power
Regulation,in THE END OF ANATURAL MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION INTHE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 47-49 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003).
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an abysmal failure in which governmental officials are "captured" by
those they regulate
A.

Public Utlity Regulaton: MarketFailureorRent Seeking?

Price regulation of energy firms was frequently based on the
premise that the production and distribution of energy is a natural
monopoly and, if firms were left unregulated, they would underproduce and charge excessive rates. For example, the modem,
investor-owned electric utility was conceived in late nineteenth-century
Chicago, by Samuel Insull, an associate of Thomas Edison.
Eventually, Chicago Edison (Commonwealth Edison's predecessor),
competing for increased service territory, realized that ownership of
multiple generators within the same firm allowed significant
coordination economies.' Because of its technical characteristics (for
example, it cannot be stored), electricity must be moved on a closely
coordinated, integrated transmission system that displays large
economies of scale
Insull was able to consolidate a geographic
service territory for a single utility, Chicago Edison; the utility was
required to provide service, and in return the utility was given an
exclusive franchise, precluding others from providing service within its
assigned area.
Under the traditional approach to natural monopoly regulation of
gas and electric utilities, regulators define a franchise service area for a
public utility, guaranteeing it access to customers within this area.
Once a franchise is defined, the traditional approach to regulating the
electric utility is to regulate rates in a manner designed to approximate
the results of a competitive market. In a competitive market, price
equals long-run marginal economic cost, including a normal rate of
return on capital. In contrast, though, a monopolist can increase its
profits by charging prices that exceed marginal cost. Because
marginal cost is difficult to measure directly, regulators approximate
marginal cost by computing the utility's invested capital (rate base),
determining an allowable rate of return on that invested capital, and
5.
BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION:
CREATING,
DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS 206-40 (1980).
6.
HAROLD L. PLATr, THE ELECTRIC CITY: ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE
CHICAGO AREA, 1880-1930, at 74-82 (1991).

7.
The differences between electricity and other commodities are only differences in
degree. For instance, other industries face physical constraints on transportation (e.g.,
railroads) and other commodities are difficult and costly to store (e.g., natural gas). Firms in
the electricity industry, like firms in other industries, have found ways to economize on the
costly technical characteristics of electricity.
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setting rates designed to produce the prescribed rate of return on
capital.
As historians such as Richard Hirsh describe it, electric utility
managers themselves sought the proliferation of the natural monopoly
price regulation model in individual states Insull himself headed a
trade association called the National Electric Light Association
(NELA), which played a key role in proposing and lobbying for state
regulation of electric utilities throughout the United States. NELA
viewed municipal ownership of utilities as the main alternative to price
regulation, but opposed public ownership. A compromise position
forged by the University of Wisconsin economist John Commons, who
worked together with Insull, supported state price regulation of
privately owned utilities in states such as Wisconsin and New York
During most of the twentieth century, the production of other
energy resources, such as oil and gas, was not directly price regulated
by federal regulators but was heavily regulated by states to stabilize
production and to define and protect contract and property interests
over time. Ownership of oil and gas was largely determined by a "rule
of capture," which was first articulated as a nineteenth century
common law principle.'" Under the rule of capture, the owner of land
has an incentive to quickly appropriate as much of an energy resource
as possible to limit the owner's neighbor from winning the race to
appropriate the resource. The race to acquire wealth contributed to
enormous waste, with entire pools of oil and gas drained within a few
short years. In response to this problem, many states adopted
conservation regulations, limiting the number of wells that could be
drilled and the amount of oil that could be pumped. "Unitization" was
a contractual approach in which multiple adjacent producers in an oil
field delegated authority to a single field operator; the operator then
apportioned rents among various producers, achieving a similar
purpose. Some states made unitization compulsory.
Although a market failure story can be told to support traditional
utility regulation and oil and gas conservation requirements, public
choice theory provides an alternative account of the origins and
purposes of governmental intervention. One of the earliest empirical
studies in the public choice literature, by George Stigler and Claire
Friedland, focused on the electric power industry. Their study found
8.
RICHARD E HIRSH, POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCrURING INTHEAMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 23(1999).

9.
10.

Bradley, supm note 4, at 48.
Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
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no significant variation in any measure associated with regulation
(including prices and revenues) across states, with or without
commissions, or across periods, before or after the initiation of
commission regulation." These early findings raise a serious question
about the purpose of regulation. If regulation of electricity does not
lower rates or revenues, then what purpose does it serve?
An early response developed by public choice scholars answered
this question with cynicism towards government regulation. These
forms of regulation could be understood as a type of rent seeking by
large firms, which lobbied government to protect their market share in
ways that may have reduced or limited aggregate wealth. In
advocating government auctioning of monopoly franchises, Harold
Demsetz argued that "the rivalry of the open market place disciplines
more effectively than do the regulatory processes of the commission."'2
George Stigler advanced Demsetz's cynicism in a path breaking
article, in which he argued that regulation can be understood
economically as a commodity, and is prone to influence by powerful
interest groups such as regulated industries.'3 At the extreme, this lent
support for the "regulatory capture" theory of the regulatory process,
in which bureaucrats were understood to be captured by the powerful
business groups they regulated.' 4 Richard Posner contrasted the
"capture" view to "public interest" accounts, stressing how price
increases could be attributed to regulation of oil and other industries
and how producers' surplus was largely dissipated through rentseeking outlays.' 5 Gary Becker elaborated that regulators will find
most policies that concentrate their benefits on a few powerful interest6
groups while dispersing their costs among many most attractive.1
Electric and natural gas utilities, which were powerful producer
interest groups at the state and local level, were exactly the kind of
strong, homogenous interest group economists initially predicted to
exploit the regulatory process under the Stigler and Becker model. An
early empirical study by Gregg Jarrell found strong empirical evidence
George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can RegulatorsRegulate? The Case
11.
ofElectricity,5 J.L. & EcON. 1, 11 (1962).
Harold Demsetz, WhyRegulate Utilities, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 65 (1968).
12.
13. George J.Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic Regulation; 2 BELL J.ECON. & MGMT.
Sci. 3, 4 (1971).
14.

MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION

184 (1955).
15. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974).
16. Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q. J.OF ECON. 371, 385 (1983).
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favoring state regulation of electric power as pro-producer, supporting
the industry capture thesis.'7
Later studies, however, are far less sanguine about the plausibility
of industry capture or of a simplistic, producer rent seeking dominated
account of energy regulation at the state and local level. Sam Peltzman
extended Stigler's model, focusing on consumer as well as producer
interests.' Political scientists have found this approach attractive,
taking into account consumer interests as well as producer interests in
their assessment of the regulatory process.'9 More recent economic
studies of the issue find little direct support for the industry capture
thesis in the context of state electric power regulation. One recent
study draws on Peltzman's extension of Stigler's interest group model
to emphasize that state regulation of utilities was a response to both
consumer interest groups and inefficiencies in municipal regulation.0
Consumer interest groups have also been found to be quite influential
in recent modifications to state utility regulation, such as the creation
of government-funded consumer advocates. 2' As George Priest
emphasized in his survey of the state adoption of utility regulators,
neither the pure "capture" explanation nor the altruistic "public
interest" model of regulation adequately addresses the nuances of the
interactions that occur among regulated firms, other stakeholders, and
regulators. Nuanced study of such interactions is fundamental to any
theory of the origin and source of change of regulation.
Regulation of oil and gas production at the state level provides a
parallel example of what might be characterized as rent seeking by
producers to establish quotas on production to protect their contract
and property interests. By limiting supply through conservation
requirements, or through unitization, such restrictions had the effect of
keeping oil and gas prices artificially high, nicely aligning regulatory
policies with the interests of incumbent producers. However,
17. Gregg A. Jarrell, The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility
Industry,21 J.L. & ECON.269, 293 (1978).
18. See Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation Alter a Decade of
Deregulation,1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTvrTY: MICROECONOMICS 1 (1989).

19. William D. Berry, An Alternative to the Capture Theory ofRegulation: The Case
ofState Public UtilityCommissions,28 AM. J.POL. Sci. 524, 526 (1984).
20. See Christopher R. Knittel, The Adoption of State Electrcity Regulation: The
Role ofInterest Groups,54 . INDUS. EcoN. 201 (2006).
21. Guy L.E Holbum & Richard G. Vanden Bergh, ConsumerCapture ofRegulatory
Institutions: The Creation of Public Utility Consumer Advocates inthe United States, 126
PUB.CHOICE 45, 62 (2006).
22. George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of
Regulation"Debate,36 J.L. & EcON. 289, 293-94 (1993).
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producers in oil and gas have varied interests, given the different
concerns of large and small producers. Empirical support that state
regulation was primarily due to producer rent seeking-as opposed to
the inefficiency of the alternative regulatory approach represented by
the legal rule of capture-is mixed at best. Gary Libecap's study of
the Texas Railroad Commission's regulation of oil production
concluded that regulators raised and stabilized prices to the advantage
of small producer interests." In a separate study analyzing oil field
unitization, Libecap and Steven Wiggins conclude that the approach of
states such as Texas and Oklahoma was largely ineffective in
comparison to the federal approach because it only allowed for
compulsory unitization after oil fields were fully explored and
developed." These requirements were primarily favored by smaller
producers rather than large producers.
While public choice theory has advocated for some cynicism
regarding regulation-especially where state and local regulation is at
issue'-public choice models (and empirical analysis of their
hypotheses) do not universally lead to the condemnation of state and
local regulation as captured by energy producers. Public choice theory
has long recognized that even competitive firms engage in rent
seeking. Concentrated industries with powerful interests, such as
energy supply industries at the state and local level, may not be as
successful as less powerful, more numerous interest groups. As
Gordon Tullock observes, "Such monster industries as big oil and the
natural gas producers do not do as well in dealing with the government
as do little oil or, in the gas case, households."26 Tullock's work
highlights how different interest groups face different efficiency
returns to rent seeking. Indeed, the fact that consumer groups, and
even environmental concerns, have been as successful as they have in
influencing legislation and regulation at the subnational level indicates
that the interest group impact on energy regulation is not limited to
producers.

23.

Gary D. Libecap, The PoliticalEconomy ofCrude Oil Cartelization in the United

States, 1933-1972,49 J.ECON. HIST. 833, 854 (1989).

24. Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, The Influence of Private Contractual
FailureonRegulation The Caseof Oil Field Unitization,93 J.POL. ECoN. 690, 692 (1985).
MASHAW, supra note 2, at 199.
25.
Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in EFFICIENT RENT-SEEKING:
26.
CHRONICLE OF AN INTELLECTUAL QUAGMIRE 3 (Alan A. Lockard & Gordon Tullock eds.,

2000).
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Public Choice, the Stabilityof the Regulatory Contractand
TraditionalDoctninesofPublic UlityLaw

Regulatory lawyers often view natural monopoly regulation as a
"regulatory compact," a fictional contract between the utility and the
state.17 Under this compact, the utility consents to certain obligations,
such as the duty to serve customers, in return for its geographic
franchise and expected recovery of its costs of service through
regulated rates.28 In the parlance of economists, the relationship
between a utility and government can be understood within a long
term contract framework, given the large amounts of capital required
for network infrastructure and the complexity of the underlying
environment, leading to poor specification of contractual terms.29 This
is not a mere bilateral contract between a firm and the government but
a contract that also includes consumer and environmental interest
groups.
Twentieth century regulatory law imposed a duty to serve on
natural gas and electric utilities, requiring them to provide service to
customers even where it was not economically profitable." For all the
rhetoric in American law about "universal service" and the "duty to
serve," during the era of rate regulation consumer service obligations
were frequently undertaken voluntarily by utilities as opposed to by
legal mandate. Companies (beginning with utilities such as Chicago
Edison) relied on the scale economies claim to support their
monopolies but, in return for an exclusive franchise (precluding others
from providing service within a defined geographic area) and rate
regulation (guaranteeing recovery of capital costs), these firms
understood that they were agreeing to an important condition: the
extension and continued provision of service to all customers.
Universal service was considered a key part of the natural monopoly

27. J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 204-07 (1997).

28. Hirsh, supa note 8, at 26-29.
29. Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation andAdministered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 426, 441-44 (1976); Priest, supra note 22, at 294; Oliver E. Williamson,
Transaction-CostEconomics The Governance of ContractualRelations, 22 J.L. & ECON.
233, 257-58 (1979).
30.
CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL WM. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 178-83 (1986).

HeinOnline -- 84 Tul. L. Rev. 388 2009-2010

2009]

CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION

franchise bargain even where it was not an express term of the
bargain."
Twentieth century U.S. regulators built on an ancient common
law duty that applied to public utilities such as ferries, flour mills, and
railroads. This duty imposed on electric utilities a "duty to serve"--an
obligation to provide extraordinary levels of service to customers,
especially small residential customers. As applied by courts and
regulators in most states, the public utility duty to serve entailed
several obligations, among them duties to interconnect and extend
service if requested, to provide continuing reliable service, to provide
advanced notice of service disconnection, and to continue service even
though a customer could not make full payment. Unlike other
obligations that applied to private firms, including those such as inns
and restaurants representing or holding themselves out as serving the
public, in the public utility context the duty to serve required service
where it was not ordinarily considered profitable.
The link between the public utility concept and the duty to serve
survived many different regulatory eras and institutional arrangements,
garnering a variety of intellectual explanations. There are strong
fairness and distributional arguments supporting a duty to serve.
However, public choice aspects of the regulatory contract also provide
a strong explanation for the service obligations imposed on gas and
electric utilities. Under the natural monopoly regulatory framework,
the duty to provide service, even where it is not immediately
profitable, presented some benefits to producers as well as to
consumers. An electric or gas utility was allowed to seek compensation for the costs of providing service through regulated rates, while
also providing customers adequate opportunities to contest service
curtailment or to seek an alternative supplier. The service continuation
obligation facilitated intra-class cross-subsidization by building into all
customers' rates the costs of customers who cannot afford to pay the
full costs of their bills. Although this likely led to mismatches between
any one customer's costs and rates, it allowed utilities to spread these
risks among all customers and thus was not necessarily inefficient.
When a utility removed a customer who could not afford full payment
from its system by disconnecting service, two things occurred. First,
the utility avoided the variable costs of producing energy, typically the
price of the fuel required to deliver the units of energy to the customer.
Second, because service continuation gave the utility leverage in
31.

PLATr, supm note 6, at 24-25.
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collection, the utility forewent any revenue that it might have been able
to collect from the household if service were continued. So, assuming
excess capacity, there may have been a general economic advantage to
all ratepayers in keeping as many customers as possible on the system.
Service continuation obligations allowed the utility to spread fixed
costs (for existing capacity) over a larger number of customers and to
reduce the portion of each customer's bill allocated to fixed costs.32
Thus, even in the event of "nonpayment, it may be cost-effective for a
utility with excess capacity to continue service to a customer and to
accommodate the nonpaying customer by working out a partial
payment plan, so long as it [is] reasonably expected that the customer
can pay at least the variable cost of service.""
Both consumer groups and utilities saw it as to their benefit to
allow regulators to strike a balance to ensure that the benefits of
universal access to utility service offset these costs, allowing the duty
to serve to have a relatively continuous and stable coexistence with
franchise and price regulation under natural monopoly regulation. As
consumer service obligations illustrate, the general approach of the
traditional rate regulation model aligned many consumer interests and
the interests of the regulated firm. For similar reasons, the rate
regulation process lived in relative harmony with many environmental
interest groups, as it was generally expected that the costs of
environmental controls would be approved by state regulators in the
rate-making process.
The public utility regulatory bargain presented a relatively stable
regulatory equilibrium at the state and local level in energy industries
throughout the twentieth century for two reasons. To begin, the
iterated structure of rate regulation created expectations of stability for
the firm and helped to reduce the asymmetry of information between
the firm and the regulator. If in one period the firm was undercompensated for its activities, the regulator could make up the
difference in the next period. Likewise, if the firm incurred windfalls,
regulators might recoup some of these in a future period. In this sense,
repeated iterations made the rate-making process self-correcting from
the perspective of the firm and its costs. This might explain part of the

32. Roger Colton, A Cost-Based Response to Low-Income Energy Problems, 127
PUB. UTIL. FORT. 31, 34-35 (1991).
33. Jim Rossi, The Common Law "'DutyTo Serve" andProtectionof Consumersin
an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1233, 1273
(1998).
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traditional preference of regulatory agencies for case-by-case
regulation of the firm over industry-wide rulemaking. '
The iterated negotiation of rate making also provided a stable
backdrop due to the historical structure of industry and interest group
stakeholders. Although traditional rate regulation did present some
significant problems (such as the Averch-Johnson effect discussed
below), price regulation of natural monopolies concentrated the
benefits and dispersed the costs of regulation."
Regulated industries also provided a relatively stable equilibrium
for the primary nonfirm interest group stakeholders, such as consumer
and environmental concerns." Rate making provided stability in rates
for customers, while also subsidizing access to service for low-income
and rural customers. For environmental interest groups as well, the
rate-making process produced great opportunities. With only a few
large firms providing service in a given state jurisdiction, the politics
of environmental regulation at the state and national levels could
portray large monopolies as the primary targets for pollution control
and other environmental maldates. While utilities were not always
complacent about pollution controls-especially those imposed on
existing plants with little or no guarantee of cost recovery-firms were
also not unaware of the low stakes most locally-sanctioned, forwardlooking environmental controls presented to them. Through the rate
making process, the cost of complying with these mandates could be
spread among all customers, rather than concentrated upon the firm or
its shareholders.
Because the homogenous, vertically-integrated utility could
negotiate for regulation at relatively low costs, coordinated solutions to
most conflicts were worked out before regulatory commissions, not
courts. A good example is the application of constitutional takings
protections to utility rate-making proceedings. In the early days of
utility regulation at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States
Supreme Court endorsed a "fair value" test, an approach that thrust
courts into the business of valuing utility rates on substantive due
process grounds. 7 These early rate-making cases, decided largely
during the Lochnerera (in which courts looked with disfavor on state
regulation of economic activity), take an ad hoc approach to
34.
(1981).
35.

PAUL

J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES

Derthick & Quirk, supra note 3, at 9-10.

36.

JIM Rossi, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW

37.

See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 541 (1898).

43 (2005).
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adjudicating whether government-set rates are constitutional. The
inquiry into fair value required courts to consider a range of facts--"to
be given such weight as may be just and right in each case"--in
determining whether fair value was provided.38 Takings cases of the
period have been described as ad hoc and unpredictable, leading to
"endless litigation" and calling into question the role of courts in
reviewing economic matters.39 Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice
Holmes, famously criticized the substantive judicial inquiry into fair
value for requiring courts to invest substantial resources into
determining utility rates without producing a very useful economic
rate structure. °
Following Justice Brandeis' advice, the Supreme Court
repudiated this activist position in the 1940s, adopting instead an "end
4
results" test. In Federal Power Commission v Hope Natural Gas Co., '
the Court indicated that it will focus on the result rather than the
method of rate making. According to Justice Douglas, "It is not theory
but the impact of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the
rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial
inquiry... is at an end."'2 This approach is consistent with the Court's
repudiation of Lochmer and its generally deferential judicial review of
economic regulation in the New Deal era.
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this deferential approach to
reviewing utility price regulation in every case decided since 1944. In
Market Street Railway v RailroadCommission, the Court refused to
require compensation where the government did not authorize full
recovery of the costs of obsolete technology. 3 Later, in the Permian
Basin Rate Cases the Court rejected a challenge to the Federal Power
Commission's ability to set area-wide rates for natural gas, reasoning
that there is no constitutional obligation to determine individual rates
on a cost of service basis.' The most recent rate-making case

38.

Id.at 546-47.

39. Jim Chen, The Second Coming ofSmyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. RE. 1535, 1556
(1999).
40. See Missouri v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 299-302 (1923) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
41.
Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
42. Id.
43. Mkt. St. Ry. v. R.R. Comm'n of Cal., 324 U.S. 548, 557, 564-65 (1945)
(deferring to regulators' decision not to allow recovery of San Francisco street cars and bus
lines valued by regulators at less than one-third the amount at which they would have been
valued using historical or reproduction costs).
44. Inre Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 768 (1968).
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considered by the Court, Duquesne Light Co. v Barasch,' upheld a
lower court's disallowance of nuclear assets that were not "used and
useful" and expressly reaffirmed Hope. "Today we reaffirm these
teachings of Hope Natual Gas."' Although the Court frequently does
review the procedures used by regulatory bodies, it continues its
reluctance to review the economic reasoning of regulatory decisions
involving public utilities.
Two rationales explain the Supreme Court's deferential approach
to utility rate-making cases. First, because the rate-making process is
an ongoing interaction between firms and other stakeholders and
regulators, the process is largely self-correcting. Regulators may
underestimate the cost of capital in one year, but in a later year,
through modifications, they can correct any deficiency in utility
earnings and revenues by adjusting cost of capital. Hence, there is
little in terms of increased accuracy to be gained from judicial review.
Second, in a nod to the insights of public choice perspectives on
the regulatory process, courts seem to recognize that the political
process already provides adequate protections for utilities and their
investors. Utility rate making, which tends to be a transparent and
well-developed regulatory procedure, provides a forum for regulators
to balance the interests of investors, firms, consumers, and the state.
According to Richard Pierce:
Detailed judicial review of ratemaking had little, if any, effect in
constraining the political process. Moreover, the judicial review
process imposed high error costs and high judicial resource costs.
Thus, the "end result" test announced in Hope can be seen as a decision
to allocate to the political institutions of government near total power to
protect the constitutional values underlying the takings clause in the
ratemaking context. This is required by the severe institutional
limitations of the judiciary as a potential source of protection of those
values.47
In utility regulation controversies, courts use the deferential
approaches of cases like Hope, Market Street Railway,PermianBasin,
and Duquesneover the more ad hoc approach to review,48 such as those
they have adopted in some recent land use takings cases.
45. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 302 (1989).
46. Id.at 310.
47. Richard I Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary
Attempt To Police the Poiticallnstitutions, 77 GEo. L.J. 2031, 2046 (1989).
48. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, DisentanglingDeregulatoryTakings; 86 VA.
L. REv. 1435, 1453-56 (2000).
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In addressing the application of takings jurisprudence to changes
in utility regulation, Gregory Sidak and Daniel Spulber rely on public
choice type arguments to conclude that the regulatory contract imposes
constitutional obligations on the state to fulfill the terms of the
regulatory bargain."9 However, Justice Black's articulation of the
purpose of regulatory takings--'"to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole"-is simply not a
central concern in utility regulation." As Richard Goldsmith argues:
"[R]ate regulators do not allocate burdens between the 'public' on the
one hand and the 'few' on the other" but balance "the cost of utility
service between large classes of investors and consumers."" It would
be particularly odd to invoke takings protections to the advantage of
investors and the utility industry since they have an overwhelming
advantage in information, wealth, and political power and "boast a
superior ability to bear risk and to mitigate damage from unforeseen
contingencies-the precise economic attributes that justify the
imposition of liability in virtually every other legal context." 2 In fact,
given their comparative institutional disadvantage in making politically
accountable policy decisions, courts generally defer to regulators and
avoid involving themselves actively in the policing of utility rate
regulation. 3
This is not to suggest that the takings clause is without any
application to utility price regulation. In Duquesne, the Supreme
Court expressly recognized that there is a constitutional limit in setting
utility prices; if regulators threaten the financial integrity of a utility or
provide inadequate compensation to current equity owners for the risks
associated with their investments, they may effectuate a taking. 4
Although lower courts occasionally raise such concerns," the Court
49. SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 27, at 119-26.
50. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
51.
Richard Goldsmith, Utility Rates and "'Takings," 10 ENERGY L.J. 241, 255
(1989).
52. See Chen, supm note 39, at 1559.
53.
See Pierce, supra note 47, at 2032.
54. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 312-14 (1989) ("No argument has
been made that these slightly reduced rates jeopardize the financial integrity of the
companies, either by leaving them insufficient operating capital or by impeding their ability
to raise future capital. Nor has it been demonstrated that these rates are inadequate to
compensate current equity holders for the risk associated with their investments under a
modified prudent investment scheme.").
55.
See, e.g., Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 810 E2d
1168, 1181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing and remanding FERC's disallowance of
unamortized nuclear investment from rate base for failure to provide an explanation); id.
at
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has not applied these limits in the utility rate-setting context and its
cases over the past fifty years do not suggest any eagerness to engage
in a more activist review of utility price setting. In fact, despite
Duquesne's anticipation that takings claims may legitimately be
asserted against regulators' price setting, some lower courts interpret
interest to justify the
the cases as allowing a significant public
56
utility.
regulated
a
of
financial destruction
The implications of public choice for traditional public utility
regulation in the energy sector are not unidirectional. Public choice
focuses primarily on the behavior of government actors in response to
private influence, but once a government has selected a specific policy,
public choice also highlights how expectations regarding government
behavior can affect private behavior. Specifically, an expectation of
favorable regulatory treatment can influence the behavior of firms in
their private investment decisions. If courts were to provide the kind of
constitutional protections that commentators such as Sidak and
Spulber envision, this could perversely encourage firms to over-invest
in uneconomic projects with an expectation that the government would
compensate them if the investments do not yield an adequate return.
For example, economists have noted that traditional price
regulation may create incentive for an industry to adopt a higher than
optimal capital to labor ratio in the industry. This phenomenon, known
among economists as the "Averch-Johnson" effect,57 has some
empirical support in the context of electric power, 8 although its
magnitude is widely debated among economists. Regardless of the
1193 (Starr, J., concurring) (arguing that a "reasoned consideration" of investor interests
requires more than a mechanical application of rules but consideration of what expectations
exist under a regulatory compact).
56. See Ohio Edison Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 589 N.E.2d 1292, 1300 n.8 (Ohio
1992) (asserting boldly that the Constitution "no longer provides any special protection for
the utility investor" (internal quotation marks omitted); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 578 So. 2d 71, 106 (La. 1991) (holding that a taking will be found only when the
state "failed to consider the legitimate interests of the utility and its investors in a higher rate
of return, and to weigh those interests against the competing concerns of the rate-payers").
57. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint 52AM. ECON. REv. 1052, 1068 (1962).
58. Economists have found some empirical support for existence of the AverchJohnson effect. See Ieon Courville, Regulation and EVIciency in the Electric Utility
Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sc. 53, 72 (1974); H. Craig Petersen, An EmpiricalTest
of Regulatory Effects, 6 BELL J. ECON. 111, 124 (1975); Robert M. Spann, Rate of Return
RegulationandEiTiciency in Production: An EmpiricalTest of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5
BELL J.ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 38, 50 (1974).
59. If the expected rate of return used by regulators is below the cost of capital, the
empirical results seem mixed, at best. See William J. Boyes, An EmpiricalExamination of
the Averch-JohnsonEffect 14 ECON. INQUIRY 25 (1976); W Davis Dechert, Hasthe Averh-
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size of the Averch-Johnson effect, it is commonly recognized that
many firms in the electric power industry over-invested in certain types
of capital, such as power generation. In the 1960s and 1970s, utilities
made many investments (often with the blessing of regulators) that,
with hindsight, do not seem prudent. For instance, in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, power plants in excess of 1100 megawatts were
designed and installed using extrapolation by growth methods. 6 The
new machines were not as efficient as previously installed plants, yet
once decisions were made to site and build these plants, customers
were forced to pay for the older, less efficient plants. Regulators
approved many of these decisions to build mammoth power plants. In
many circumstances, regulators even encouraged construction of these
plants using extrapolation by growth to predict continuing growth in
electricity, even though sales growth figures declined drastically post1960. For instance, the five-year moving average of sales declined
from around seven percent in 1960 to two percent in 1996, so if
regulators used this data they would greatly overestimate growth rates
in certain generation markets." Over time, the result of regulators'
decisions to approve these plants was a higher than optimal capital to
labor ratio in the industry.
The investment decisions of firms under this regulatory order at
the state and local level have had an enormous practical impact on the
structure of energy industries. For example, decisions to approve
utility-operated power plants for local customers served as a substitute
for investing capital to expand transmission facilities to wheel power
from more remote sources have a continuing effect on the structure of
the industry today. For most of the twentieth century, the verticallyintegrated utility treated on-system generation as a substitute for the
expansion of transmission, leading to serious underinvestment in
transmission infrastructure in key regions of the nation. Limited
transmission capacity-a constraint shaped by the old regulatory
order-remains the most significant problem in the electric power
industry today. For example, in states such as Texas and Vermont,
wind producers do not have adequate access to transmission to reach
customers, threatening the financing and economic viability of the
new generation of renewable power projects. Private incentives for
Johnson Effect Been TheoreticallyJustfied, 8 J.ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL (1984). For a
review of the evidence, see Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, Regulation in Theory and
Prctice: An Overview, in STUDIES INPUBLIC REGULATION I (Gary Fromm ed., 1977).
60. Hirsh, supra note 8, at 58.
61.
Id.
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expanding transmission, which remains a natural monopoly, are widely
seen by industry experts as somewhere between nonexistent and
Public choice implications for private investment
inadequate.
decisions under the existing legal framework may well have
contributed to this failed incentive structure. Federal regulators
approaching climate change policy cannot ignore it.
I.

THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL REGULATION: PUBLIC CHOICE,
FEDERALISM, AND LOGROLLING IN ENERGY LEGISLATION

During the twentieth century, national energy legislation also rose
to prominence. Major national legislative initiatives span several eras.
During the New Deal era, Congress adopted both the Federal Power
Act and the Natural Gas Act. Since the New Deal, several major
energy statutes have been enacted, primarily in reaction to international
events. During the energy crisis of the 1970s and the international
swirl surrounding the OPEC Oil Embargo, Congress adopted
comprehensive energy legislation that includes statutes such as the
Natural Gas Policy Act and the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act." Following the first Gulf War, Congress adopted the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, and in 2005, Congress passed a major post-9/11
energy statute designed to enhance energy independence.
Two public choice themes recur in national energy legislation.
The first theme is the ongoing relevance of federalism and the division
of authority between states and the national government. Public
choice approaches help to shed light on why some energy issues
remain within the purview of state and local regulators and outside of
the scope of national legislation. Second, energy legislation illustrates
the significance of-and problems with-logrolling in the process of
congressional lawmaking. Logrolling is responsible for the inclusion
of many significant and controversial elements in U.S. national energy
policy, but also has become a necessary component of the
comprehensive approach that Congress has invoked in recent energy
legislation.
A.

Public Choice andFederalismin EnergyPolicy

Public choice theory generally views local governments as
preferable to a centralized government. Since local governments are
62. Congress, of course, adopted major environmental legislation during the same
era, some of which affects energy industries, but the topic of environmental regulation is
discussed in another chapter.
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relatively small, homogenous, and possess a limited range of functions,
they will have the fewest democratic problems in adopting policies that
reflect and are responsive to the preferences of voters. This political
insight of public choice theory converges with efficiency defenses of
federalism. Charles Tiebout presents a systematic defense of how a
decentralized structure can achieve economic efficiency in the
provision of public goods. 3 Tiebout's model assumes that households
are freely mobile and that they shop between subnational jurisdictions
for a preferred package of services, taxes, and regulations. On this
view of competitive federalism, if any subnational jurisdiction is to
provide inefficient services, households and firms will move to a more
efficient jurisdiction.
Building on Tiebout, Wallace Oates's account of fiscal federalism
sees a central government as assigned primary responsibility for
regulatory activities involving spatially dispersed populations and
presenting significant externalities. 6' State and local governments, in
contrast, are more effective in addressing activities for which spillovers
are limited or absent. As Oates has stated, "The tailoring of outputs to
local circumstances will, in general, produce higher levels of wellbeing than a centralized decision to provide some uniform level of
output across all jurisdictions." 5 Inefficiencies may result in regulation
at the state and local level where there are significant externalities,
however, and assigning responsibility to central government in such
circumstances could be justified.
Inman and Rubinfeld build on Oates's model to describe some of
the failings with a centralized approach to regulation.' 6 As they
highlight, cooperative federalism, or relying on unanimous
interjurisdictional bargains between states and the federal government,
has not been very effective as a regulatory strategy. The costs of
reaching unanimity may be so high that no bargains are struck, and
excessive competition between jurisdictions may produce waste. As a
result, they suggest that federalism is subject to majoritarian, rather
than unanimity, constitutional requirements. But, echoing classic
public choice themes about democracy, the choice of centralized
approaches can have adverse implications for political participation,
63. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN.
416(1956).
64. WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 14-17(1972).
65. Wallace E. Oates, Federalism and Government Finance, M MODERN PUBLIC
FINANCE 126 (John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky eds., 1994).
66. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federlism, 11 J. ECON.
PERSP. 43,47-48 (1997).
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and this needs to be balanced against any efficiency gains from
centralization.
Jonathan Macey further elaborates by developing a "franchise
theory of federalism" that draws on public choice insights. His model
explains when Congress is likely to leave responsibility for regulating
an activity to state or local regulators. 7 In Macey's view, Congress
leaves matters to state or local regulators only when the political
support it is likely to obtain by doing so is greater than the political
support it obtains from regulating itself. In other words, congressional
deference to state and local regulators is a strategy members of
Congress can use to maximize political support from interest groups.
Macey concludes that Congress will "franchise" regulation to state or
local governments where: (1) a noncentralized jurisdiction has already
developed a body of regulation that is a valuable capital asset which
federal regulation would dissipate; (2) where the outcome likely to
maximize political support varies across jurisdictions due to the
existence of spatial monopolies, differences in political optima, and
variations in voter preference across regions; and (3) where Congress
can avoid damaging political opposition from special interest groups
by placing responsibility
for controversial issues on state and local
6
governments.

8

In the context of energy regulation, these public choice insights
hold explanatory power for understanding why Congress has chosen to
regulate certain activities at the national level, while leaving other
activities to state and local regulators. At the national level, the
strongest interest groups are homogenous across various geographic
regions and include producers of primary resources (such as those who
own mineral rights), producers of secondary energy resources (such as
electric utilities), and large wholesale consumers of energy (such as
municipal utilities). Industrial customers are the only well-organized
consumer interest group that has had much impact on energy
legislation at the national level. At the state and local level, the
strongest interest groups are much more localized. They include
landowners, developers, and consumers, which can be industrial,
commercial, or residential. Residential consumers are much better
organized at the state level than at the national level.

67. Jonathan R. Macey, FederalDeference to Local Regulators and the Economic
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-ChoiceExplanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv.
265, 268 (1990).
68. Id.
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When regulating electric utilities in 1935, Congress adopted a
fairly bright line separation between federal regulation of wholesale
markets and state regulation of retail activities. This legislative divide
has endured through multiple amendments to the Federal Power Act,
including major amendments in 1992 and 2005. This jurisdictional
divide has effectively left state and local regulators largely responsible
for the regulatory decisions that immediately affect retail customers.
Yet, it is fairly obvious how federal regulation of wholesale power
markets can further efficiency goals. Because electric utilities are
interconnected on a national power grid, a state's decisions to limit
production or sale of bulk power, or to limit access to its portion of the
grid, can impose a significant externality on other states. The costs to
states for unanimously agreeing to cooperate in production and sale of
power and access to electricity transmission are very high. Utility
interest groups have therefore lobbied Congress for a majoritarian
solution in the Federal Power Act, which authorized the Federal Power
Commission (the predecessor to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC)) to regulate bulk power sales. The 1978
amendments to the FPA, which were clarified in 1992 legislation, gave
FERC authority to regulate the interstate transmission grid, allowing
all utilities fair access to the power grid.
By contrast, interest groups such as landowners and nonindustrial
consumer groups are not homogenous across various geographic
regions. Land use interests are most powerful at the state and local
level, and if Congress were to co-opt regulation of this activity it would
generate substantial political opposition at the national level.
Consumer interests also are very powerful at the state level, but are
hardly a homogenous group in strength and interests given that the
costs of energy and the need for it at various times of the year differ
from state to state. Some states have relatively low energy costs and
low demand, while others face high demand and higher costs. Some
states are net energy consumers, while others are net energy producers.
Industrial consumers hold particular influence at the state level (as well
as in national debates), as they are highly mobile. For many of them,
energy represents a significant portion of their operating costs,
allowing state regulators to compete in their location decisions.
However, residential consumer locational decisions are less elastic
when it comes to changes in energy prices, but residential consumers
can remain a strong interest group when organized collectively at the
state and local level. In addition, consumer interests may have a
longstanding interest in preserving the stability of public utility
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regulation at the state and local level, which has allowed many proconsumer policies to continue and even to flourish against the
backdrop of wholesale regulation of the industry by FERC.
Of course, state and local governments have taken a particularly
aggressive approach to addressing climate change, in many instances
beating federal regulators and Congress to the punch. States have
adopted aggressive building codes, ambitious fuel efficiency
standards, cap and trade approaches to carbon emissions, and
renewable portfolio standards.69 As Congress approaches similar
programs, and enacts them into law, energy's political economy origins
highlight the significance of retaining a substantial sphere of authority
to encourage and promote state innovation. Congress should approach
preemption of such programs with caution, and courts should err
against implied preemption of state climate change programs that are
more ambitious than federal goals.
B.

LogrollmgandNationalEnergyLegislaton

Public choice can also provide an explanation for the
comprehensive approach Congress has taken in recent national energy
legislation. Given that most energy legislation over the past three
decades was passed in reaction to international concerns with oil
markets and high energy prices, the rhetoric of much energy legislation
reflects populist values. National energy debates frequently invoke
ideological positions on issues such as energy consumption, energy
prices, dependence on foreign oil, the desirability of nuclear power,
and exploration and drilling in coastal areas.
Despite the ideological framing that occurs in public debates, in
some institutional settings the actual political process of adoption may
be said frequently to reflect the convergence of self-interest on the part
of legislators whose constituents may be focused on very different
issues. For example, an early study on congressional energy voting
found members from coal-producing states likely to oppose market
oriented reforms to oil prices, while members from oil-producing
states and others were more likely to support such reforms regardless

69. For recent discussion, see William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change
LegislationandPreemption,3 ENvTL. & ENERGY L. & PoL'Y J. 261,274-78 (2008); Robert L.
Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by
FederalEnvimnmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. REv.
579, 600-01 (2008).
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of party.' Such studies should not be taken to mean that economic
self-interest always motivates congressional voting and is
determinative of outcomes. Often, ideology is a strong predictor of
congressional votes, even in the context of energy legislation. For
example, a study of natural gas deregulation legislation concluded that
more than ninety percent of the votes could be predicted by a
member's score on the annual ratings given by the Americans for
Democratic Action.7' A leading study of congressional adoption of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act suggests that ideological
or altruistic preferences have an important explanatory role in
explaining congressional votes and that models that focus exclusively
on narrow economic self-interest are poor predictors of voting
behavior.72 A stronger approach to addressing the political process in
the adoption of energy legislation is the hybrid approach, or "a mixed
model in which constituent interest, special 73 interest groups, and
ideology all help determine legislative conduct.
Of course, because congressional bills frequently involve more
than one issue, are packaged in one massive bill as a part of omnibus
legislation, or are tied to budgeting, there are many opportunities for
logrolling, or vote trading, in energy legislation. Buchanan and
Tullock's theory of logrolling in the legislative process highlights that
voting separately on an individual issue allows an outcome that reflects
a politician's preferences but does reflect the intensity of those
preferences. '4 By logrolling, a politician is able to express the intensity
of her preferences, effectively treating the voting process like a private
marketplace. For example, a member of Congress from West Virginia,
who is more or less indifferent to the issue of a federal ban on oil
exploration and drilling off the coast of Florida, may support such an
effort in return for the support a member of Congress from Florida
gives to initiatives favoring the West Virginia coal industry, which are
more important to the West Virginia member's district. Such vote

70. Albert L. Danielsen & Paul H. Rubin, An Empiricallnvestgation of Voting on
Energy Issues,31 PUB. CHOICE 121, 127 (1977).
71. Edward J. Mitchell, The Basis of CongressionalEnergy Policy, 57 TEx. L. REV.
591, 602 (1979).
72. Joseph P Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, CaptureandIdeology in the Economic Theory
ofPolitics, 74 AM. ECON. REv. 279, 279 (1984).
73.

DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL

INTRODUCTION 33 (1991).
74. See JAMES M.

BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:

LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1990).
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trading may allow a legislature to achieve results that are closer to the
provision of a socially optimal level of public good.75
Energy legislation provides a fertile ground for studying
congressional logrolling behavior. In the context of the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), for example, Congress
adopted reforms that were designed to encourage new efficiencies in
power generation, including the use of renewable resources, and also
adopted provisions designed to give greater flexibility in energy
consumption for large industrial ratepayers."6 Large corporate interests
favored the reforms, as did environmental groups. These interest
groups' support for PURPA allowed logrolling between members with
different constituent pressures. In legislation adopted in 2005,
Congress addressed a range of core energy issues, but tied these to
agriculture and transportation, allowing for similar logrolling.
Although further study is needed regarding how these specific
constituent groups influence legislative behavior, the potential for
logrolling in such contexts seems strong. It may be quite possible that
Congress passes energy legislation when a minority of legislators
strongly favors such legislation while a majority strongly opposes it.
Further, the fact that Congress continually addresses energy issues in
comprehensive legislation indicates that the bargains are struck on the
basis of logrolling are, at some fundamental level, unstable as
legislative coalitions change.
The normative significance of logrolling for energy legislation is
unclear. On the positive side, by allowing some valuation of the
intensity of preferences, logrolling may allow Congress to pass
comprehensive initiatives whose component parts may not otherwise
have sufficient political support to be adopted into law." However,
logrolling can have negative implications for political transparency,
especially where interest groups do not have similar access to
information or the ability to monitor legislation. In addition, logrolling
may not enhance welfare where the electoral system fails to define
jurisdictions according to the spillover of public goods.78 To the extent
logrolling exists, it may also indicate an instability in the bargains
reflected in certain legislation as later shifts in coalitions may
75.
Id
76. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-1 to a-3, 824i-k) (2006).
77. Id.
78. Gordon Tullock, Problems of Majority Votng, 67 1. POL. EcoN. 571, 578-79
(1959).
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undermine
bargaining that does not have strong overall political
79
support.
At a minimum, however, the existence of logrolling in the context
of comprehensive energy legislation highlights the importance to
public law of paying careful attention to statutory language in
interpreting comprehensive energy legislation. The presence of
logrolling cautions that the legislative bargains Congress struck in
attempting comprehensive approaches in reaction to high profile
events such as the Gulf Crisis may be less stable regulatory solutions
for energy markets than approaches at the state and local level, where
logrolling is less likely." It also cautions suspicion with general
appeals to statutory purpose in the context of energy legislation absent
some specific evidence of legislative purpose. Where the purpose of
such legislation is unclear, there are compelling public choice
arguments that courts should generally favor the interpretation that
would benefit the interest groups that have had the least impact at the
national level, such as residential customers or new technologies.8' As
climate change legislation is approached, similar interpretive tools
should be applied by courts in addressing ambiguous statutory
language.
IV

PUBLIC CHOICE AND ENERGY DEREGULATION

Climate change legislation also cannot ignore that most energy
industries have been deregulated in the past three decades. This does
not mean, however, that markets prevail in every energy context.
Instead, deregulation itself presents a complex maze of regulatory
approaches that needs to be integrated into climate change discussions.
In a sense, the change in regulatory approach to energy industries
represented by deregulation presents a puzzle for public choice
theorists. To the extent that the benefits of traditional regulation are
narrowly focused on a few interest groups and its costs are diffused
among many less powerful interests, a stable equilibrium exists in
favor of the status quo of traditional public utility regulation. Under
such circumstances, it is puzzling why various interests groups would
79. Dennis C. Mueller, The Possibility of a Social Welfare Function: Comment, 57
AM. ECON. REv. 1304, 1307 (1967); R.E. Park, The Possibilityof Social Welfare Function:
Conmment, 57AM. ECON. REv. 1300, 1301 (1967).
80. The constituents of different state legislators face stronger regional
commonalities than the constituents of members of Congress from different states. In
addition, state legislatures have stronger single-subject requirements than does Congress.
81.
See Einer Elhauge, Preference-ElicitingStatutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L.
REv. 2162 (2002).
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favor deregulation. If traditional modes of utility regulation were so
effective at appeasing various interest groups and coalitions, what
might explain the movement away from the traditional regulatory
bargain? The answer to this question is complex and will require
additional study by economists and political scientists. Public choice
insights, however, can provide some perspective on what led to various
types of reforms, as well as on the failures and challenges recent
reforms will face. They are especially relevant as we approach the
issues of how to address climate change in the context of deregulated
markets.
A.

Public Choiceand the PolicsofDeregulaon

A common public choice theme in the politics of regulation is to
respond to government failures by embracing market-oriented reforms,
such as deregulation. Deregulation typically entails reducing the
barriers to entry, determining prices through competition rather than
cost of service regulation, and unbundling the constituent service
traditionally provided by a vertically integrated firm. However, in the
energy context, "deregulation" is a bit of a misleading term, insofar as
it implies the complete dismantling of regulatory oversight by
government. Pro-market reforms to energy industries such as natural
gas and electric power entail a mixture of both market-oriented
reforms and new regulatory approaches."
For instance, in both
industries, policy makers have moved towards competition in the
supply of the energy resource, such as in gas production and electric
power generation, but have simultaneously continued to embrace
traditional regulation of transmission and distribution networks as
natural monopolies.83
Because such restructuring itself reflects a combination of
governmental policies, the movement to deregulated energy markets is
fundamentally a reflection of shifts in coalition politics.' Public
choice theorists have chronicled that private lobbying is focused as
much on avoiding government regulation as on trying to influence its
substantive content.
Thus, even with respect to completely
82.
Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, ElectricityRestructuring: Deregulationor
Reregulation 23 REG. 46,50-51 (2000).
83.
PAuL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS
OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 11-23 (1983).
84.
Peltzman, supm note 18.
85.
See FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING:
POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997).
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deregulated activities, interest group behavior remains relevant.
Because deregulation is itself a political decision regarding the role of
government in addressing markets, it is not immune from the same
public choice analysis that has been applied to traditional forms of
regulation.
For most of the twentieth century, growth and demand for most
energy resources were relatively predictable. Consumers were happy
because rates declined" and utilities were content with the regulatory
bargain that provided them a predictable and stable return on
investment. 7 Restructuring gained momentum due in part to
exogenous changes in economic conditions and technology, which
created price differentials across various states; such differences in
price led to shifts in the political coalitions that previously sustained
natural monopoly price regulation." As Matthew White puts it in his
careful empirical study of when states deregulated electricity, "[T]o
observe deregulation, the magnitude of the price gap must be
sufficiently large that the pressure to bring existing prices into line
with the market equilibrium cannot be accommodated within the
institutional constraints of the regulatory process."89 Price gaps and
cost differentials between different geographic areas changed the
incentives for interest groups-consumers and new entrants, such as
independent power producers-to look for relief beyond the
framework of price regulation by state and local utility commissions.
In addition, for utilities themselves, changes in economic
conditions contributed to an erosion of the utility consensus that
sustained utility regulation for most of the twentieth century. For
instance, from the 1940s through the 1960s, electric power prices
declined in both real and absolute terms. Beginning in the 1970s,
however, fuel costs began to rise substantially and, when firms sought
major rate increases, regulators faced increasing political pressure
from consumer and environmental groups to reassess the utility

86.
See WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR., THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
(1983).
87.
SIDAK & SPULBER, supm note 27, at 188-90.
88. Of course, ideology played an undeniably important role in these shifling
coalitions. Mavericks, such as Robert Crandall in the airline industry, captured the
imagination of reform-minded politicians, as well as new incumbents, but deregulation was
not merely an issue for one side of the political spectrum.
89. Michael W White, Power Struggles. Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in
Electicity Market; 1996 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTivITY: MICROECONOMICS 201
(1996).
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consensus, leading to an increasingly adversarial relationship between
utilities and rate regulators-particularly in states.'
So understood, public choice theory does not merely describe
how governmental institutions are inherently unlikely to maximize
welfare but can prove helpful to assessing how we structure legal
institutions to maximize welfare against the backdrop of such changes.
While some political reform efforts that draw on public choice theory
see rate regulation as inherently flawed, to the extent it licenses over
investment by self-interested firms who have largely captured the
agenda of regulators, a broader institutional perspective highlights a
different issue altogether. The rate regulation process did not
adequately address the economic structure of the firm, and of the
industries comprised of firms, and how under different technological
and economic conditions services could be more efficiently provided
through the marketplace and other institutional arrangements. As
incentives for private participants in the regulatory process change, due
primarily to changes in technology and economic conditions, some of
the tacit coalitions that may have supported a specific institutional
arrangement also will change. Interest group coalitions in the industry
have changed substantially from the twentieth century utility
consensus that sustained rate regulation.
In electric power, for example, at the federal level, when new
efficiencies in generation became available and utilities found
themselves locked into older technologies, a coalition in favor of
competitive reform to wholesale power markets was formed among
industrial customers, new entrants such as independent power
producers, and large wholesale utilities with high costs. At the same
time, deregulation policies at the state level have been more varied, but
generally high retail cost conditions in certain geographic areas have
led a coalition to develop between large consumers and producers. In
both contexts, public choice perspectives highlight how the political
coalitions that supported the traditional institutional arrangement are
not fixed, but produce benefits if they are modified in response to
changes in technology and economic conditions.
As a matter of interest group politics, when the consensus-or
regulatory contract-behind natural monopoly regulation began to
unravel,9' stakeholders increasingly looked to Congress and federal
90. John 0. Sillin, The Blackout of 2003: Why We Fell into the Heart ofDarkness:
The Road to the Cunent Reliability Cisis Is Paved with Four Decades of Bad Policy
Decisions, 141 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 30, 31-32 (2003).
91.
Hirsh, supra note 8, at 68-70.
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regulators for solutions. Against the backdrop of high fuel prices in
the 1970s, Congress passed PURPA as a part of President Carter's
energy plan, which fueled the growth of new entrants in power
generation, known as cogeneration facilities. PURPA spawned the
growth of a significant independent power producer sector, which
challenged incumbent utility market power in electric power
generation. Congress again expanded efforts to develop power
markets when it passed the Energy Policy Act of 1992, expanding
FERC's authority to mandate transmission access.92 FERC began to
explore mechanisms for introducing competition to wholesale
generation markets, culminating in the adoption of Order No. 888 in
the mid-1990s, which mandated access to transmission for wholesale
power supply markets.93 Such federal policies encouraged the growth
of independent power producers and have led to the proposal of
merchant power plants and some new transmission lines across the
nation as well.
Meanwhile, many states also began to experiment with retail
deregulation.
Due to the incentives created by PURPA and
technological innovations, independent power producers began to
proliferate in the 1980s. As new entrants entered the industry, the
limits of state-maintained price regulation became more obvious. Cost
of service regulation may have worked well to align consumer interests
when prices were decreasing, but when costs began to increase,
consumers were no longer a single homogenous interest group but
began to splinter into different interest groups reflecting differing
usage patterns and price elasticities-such as industrial, commercial
and residential consumers. In some states that deregulated, like
California, large industrial customers lobbied heavily for low cost
power, demanding reforms to the traditional state approach to
regulating electricity prices, while residential consumers generally
opposed deregulation. As David Spence emphasizes, "[I]ndustrial
retail customers with large, stable loads pushed for restructuring to free
themselves from the subsidy they paid to residential (and to a94lesser
extent, commercial) customers under traditional rate structures.,

92. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (amending the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(j-k) (1992)).
93. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at
18 C.F.R. pts. 35 and 385).
94. David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL
L. REv. 765, 791 (2008).
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The practical economic consequence of state-side deregulation
was exacerbated by the significant price differentials that emerged
across states by the mid-1990s. Fuel costs began to rise drastically in
the 1970s. Over time, states had adopted different mixes of power
generation (ranging from hydroelectric, to natural gas, coal, and
expensive nuclear plants) and had made a wide range of commitments
to approve the building of plants during periods using different size
and technological assumptions. Consequently, the costs of power
generation differed drastically from state to state, varying from around
$.02 per kilowatt hour to over $.08 per kilowatt hour. As one
economist describes it:
Changes in the economics of power generation have undercut the cost

structure of incumbents to the point where the costs of small-scale entry
into the power generation business are well below the average costs of
many incumbent utilities. The result is a substantial increase in the
opportunity cost of statutory entry barriers and political pressure on

regulators to close the price gap. In high-cost states the magnitude of
the price gap suggests fairly strong incentives for consumers to press for
regulatory changes, and deregulatory reforms are the natural result.95

The price gap was not only a differential between new supply entrants
and incumbents. Entrants often had some ability to purchase power on
the wholesale market at a fraction of the cost of generating their own
on-system power, but the incumbent was frequently locked into longterm contracts or, even it was not, faced little incentive to procure
power at a more competitive cost since it owned its own generation
facilities and stood to benefit by expanding its generation rather than
opening transmission to new entrants.
New entrants certainly had an impact on the unraveling of the
utility consensus, but their power in the reform process was bolstered
by the decline of the homogenous public utility firm which typically
operated in a single state jurisdiction. By 1990, even the incumbent
utility firms in the industry were no longer homogenous. Due to
mergers in the industry, many utilities operated in multiple states.
While some operated their own systems to allow generation to act as a
substitute for transmission, others possessed excess transmission
capacity and relied on off-system generation procured through
wholesale market transactions.
The former generally opposed
competitive reforms, while the latter embraced them. Utilities

95.

White, supranote 89, at 230.
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increasingly merged to bolster their efficiency and market position,
including their control over transmission.
Together, new entrants without service obligations (such as
independent power plants and merchant facilities), large industrial
customers demanding lower cost power, and utilities possessing excess
transmission capacity forged an informal alliance favoring reforms to
the industry. A large focus of this effort involved looking to federal
regulators for a consistent national policy that would overcome the
equilibrium of the state-centered natural monopoly model and stabilize
the disequilibrium of heterogeneous regulatory approaches between
states. Apart from isolated incumbent utilities, only residential
consumers and environmental interest groups, both of whom benefited
from the taxation allowed by the old locally run system, continued to
prefer the traditional approach. This newly aligned set of interests led
to demand for many new regulatory approaches, including the
possibility of a new system of federal regulation.
"Deregulation" was co-opted by the reform coalition as a
nonthreatening way to package these restructuring efforts, many of
which (contrary to the decentralized ideals of deregulation) involved
substantial increases in federal authority over certain parts of the
industry. Yet at best the reform coalition favoring deregulation of
electric power was a loose one. It has had modest success in
influencing FERC (which signed onto most of its agenda by the mid1990s), but has failed to garner sufficient support for clear
congressional action on many important issues in energy markets.
Thus, imperfect as localism may be, state and local regulation remain
an essential component of the process in which competitive markets
are being implemented in the United States.
Deregulation also led to substantial changes in the firm and
industry-wide structure of the electric power industry. The traditional
utility was a vertically-integrated natural monopoly, typically legally
sanctioned to operate as a monopolist within a geographically-defined
service territory. Beginning with technological innovation in the 1980s
and continuing through the 1990s, however, the generation sector of
the electric power industry increasingly came to be recognized as
structurally competitive."
Today, it is no longer considered
economically efficient for a single firm to provide power generation.
Most markets can efficiently sustain two or more firms generating
electric power. In recent years, the generation sector of the industry
96.

JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supranote 83, at 11-23.
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has grown remarkably and is currently seen as competitive in nature.
New firms, such as independent power producers and merchant plants
compete aggressively with incumbent utilities in many markets. Rate
regulation of generation has largely been abandoned in wholesale
power markets (regulated at the national level) and many states have
begun to deregulate the prices of retail generation as well. While
prices have largely been deregulated in the United States, many states
actively continue to regulate the environmental aspects of locating, or
siting, power generation, and emissions remain heavily regulated at the
federal and state levels. In larger power markets in the United States,
there may be dozens of options for purchasing electric power. Small
consumers may not have these options to the extent a state has not
deregulated its retail markets, but utilities have them and they are
increasingly available to large industrial customers as well.
By contrast-and presenting a particular challenge for regulatory
law-the transmission and distribution sectors of the industry continue
to be seen as natural monopolies. Previously, transmission and
distribution were often (but not always) provided by the same,
vertically-integrated firm, but today they are more frequently
disentangled. A local distribution utility often provides distribution to
the end use retail customer, while transmission is frequently provided
by a larger, multistate utility. Both transmission and distribution
continue to be heavily regulated. Although there is some jurisdictional
overlap, transmission prices are most extensively regulated by the
federal government through the FERC, while distribution prices are
regulated most extensively by the states. Transmission and distribution
continue to be considered classic network infrastructure networks,
physical access to which will be essential for competition to thrive.
FERC may regulate many transmission access and pricing issues, but
many issues relating to transmission infrastructure (including whether
to build and where to locate it) and nearly all issues regarding power
distribution remain entirely within the jurisdictional realm of state and
local regulators. In 2005, Congress expanded FERC's authority over
power transmission, but transmission remains a serious concern for
both competitive wholesale markets.97 Recently, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit interpreted FERC's new
authority narrowly, not allowing it to exercise jurisdiction over
97. For a discussion of the barriers presented by the state transmission siting process,
see Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting TransmissionLines in a ChangedMilieu: Evolving
Notions ofthe 'PublicInterest'in Balancing State andRegionalConsiderations,81 COLO. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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applications for transmission siting that had been denied by state
regulators within one year. It is also well recognized that climate
change goals will require expanded federal authority, given the
distance between many renewable resources-like wind-and large
customer bases."
But expanding federal authority alone over
transmission is not likely to solve problems faced by renewable power
developers. New transmission facilities could easily become a Trojan
horse for lower cost sources of power, such as coal, as lower cost
resources are favored given the deregulated wholesale markets.
Approaches to climate change must be designed to work within, rather
than against, the deregulated wholesale market, by finding ways to
encourage investment in transmission infrastructure to address new
power sources while simultaneously recognizing that open access will
require l°carbon-neutral approaches to transmission cost allocation
pricing. 0
B.

GovernmentFailureVersus MarketFailurein EvaluatingMarketOrientedEnergyPolicies

In summer 2003, a massive blackout left fifty million customers
throughout much of the Northeast and portions of the Midwest without
electric power. The blackout affected an area extending from New
York, Massachusetts, and New Jersey west to Michigan, and from
Ohio north to Toronto and Ottawa, Ontario. The economic costs it
imposed are staggering.' °' Media accounts were quick to blame the
blackout on deregulatory policies the electric power industry adopted
through the 1980s and 1990s.' °2 However, there is little reason to
expect traditional rate regulation would have fared better in avoiding
the 2003 blackout. Moreover, while intuitively appealing, efforts to
98.
Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 558 E3d 304, 309-10 (4th
Cir. 2009).

99. See Hearing on Legislation Regarding Electric Transmission Lines Before the
Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of John
Wellinghoff, Acting Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n).
100. For discussion, see Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Transmission Line Siting
Authority, 40 ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2010).
101. See ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS RESOURCE COUNCIL, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
THE AUGUST 2003 BLACKOUT (2004), http://www.elcon.org/Documents/EconomiclmpactsOf

August2003Blackout.pdf. Some estimated the costs of the 2003 blackout to be as high as $5
billion. Nancy Gibbs, Lights Out TIME, Aug. 25, 2003, at 30.

102. On one account, "The current industry-centered deregulation of the national
power grid has created market-driven chaos, with electric bills skyrocketing as high as 300
percent in California while power systems become less and less reliable-all at a time when
the shrinking cost of renewable energy should be providing lower costs and a more reliable
system." Michael I. Niman, Why the Lights Went Out HUMANiST, Nov. 1,2003, at 4.
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blame deregulation for the problem fail utterly to explain the
mechanism by which deregulation policies might have contributed to
Public choice insights help in unraveling this
the problem.
mechanism.
As the California deregulation debacle illustrates, the policies
pursued in furtherance of deregulation itself are often the result of
private self-interest's influence on governmental decision makers
rather than sound economic policy. At both the federal and state
levels, deregulation policies have been supported by a new political
coalition that includes large industrial consumers as well as utility
However, various policy
producers, particularly new entrants.
compromises at both federal and state levels have produced some
seriously suspicious deregulation policies and, in many instances, these
policies are to blame for failures in the operation of deregulated
markets. In other markets, the failures with deregulation may have as
much to do with the political choices that are being made in adopting
pro-market reforms as with markets themselves.
The popular press's account of deregulation's failure in the energy
context is that the dismantling of government regulation coupled with
enhanced competition between firms led to predatory market conduct
by private firms that harmed consumers. In California's newly
deregulated electric power market in the late 1990s, energy supply
firms were able to manipulate supply and prices, seeking short-term
gain at a cost to consumers. ' Similarly, in deregulated wholesale
power markets (structured primarily by federal as opposed to state
regulators), private greed is seen as contributing to a serious shortage
in generation supply and transmission capacity, exacerbating the
blackouts that left New York City and much of the northeastern United
States in the dark in summer 2003.'" On this account of deregulation's
weakness, private greed in the marketplace is the core cause of failures
in the transition to competitive markets.
Public choice insights illustrate how this account fails to present
the full story. For example, the failure of electric power deregulation in
California was as much a consequence of ill-conceived government
competition policies advocated by reform-oriented interest groups as it
103. Jacqueline Long Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the
Rise andFailofEnronon EnergyMarkets,4 Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 1,71 (2004).
104. Matthew L. Wald, A Question Still Unansvered How Did the Blackout
Happen?, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/10/business/10black
out.html (quoting Robert Blohm, an electricity consultant questioning whether deregulation
impaired reliability and caused the blackout to spread).
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was a consequence of private greed in deregulated markets. Like most
deregulated markets, California's plan to deregulate retail electric
power did not completely dismantle government regulation. Instead, it
emphasized new types of regulation, such as a state-supervised power
pool that prohibited certain types of transactions and sanctioned others.
Wholesale power supply markets, largely deregulated by the federal
government in the 1990s, before California's retail market opened, are
subject to market-based supply decisions by private firms and large
price swings. California retail power suppliers, on the other hand, were
subject to a price cap imposed by state lawmakers' 5 and were also
prohibited from using long-term contracts to serve retail customers.' 6
These policy choices by California lawmakers reflected a compromise
designed to protect consumers. Due to the state-imposed price cap,
California utilities were precluded from passing on their costs to
customers, forcing them to absorb monumental losses in highly
volatile short-term supply markets when wholesale power prices
skyrocketed. Several electric power utilities in the state-previously
considered risk-free investments under the traditional regulatory
compact-went bankrupt. Undoubtedly, state policy decisions in
California to cap retail prices and prohibit long-term contracts were
influenced by strategic lobbying and other regulatory maneuvers on
the part of private stakeholders in the California lawmaking process.
Private manipulation of government regulation is as significant as, and
may even eclipse, private abuse of competitive markets as the cause of
California's failed approach to electric power deregulation.
Public choice themes also can inform regulatory failures in
addressing the issue of transmission access and reliability-perhaps
the greatest problem competitive markets in electric power will face in
the coming decade. The massive blackout in summer 2003 left large
portions of the Northeast and Midwest without power due to a
cascading failure of the interstate transmission grid. The 2003
blackout may have been triggered by individual negligence (and
perhaps even greed, though that is doubtful), but private behavior in
the market was certainly not the immediate reason the blackout spread
from Ohio, where it is widely reported the initial event leading to the
105.

Jim Rossi, The Electric DeregulationFiasco: Lookng to Regulatory Federalism

To Promote a Balance Between Markets and the Provisionof Public Goods, 100 MCH. L.
RE. 1768, 1769 (2002); Paul L. Joskow, Califomia Electricity Crisis, 17 OXFORD REV.
ECON. PoL'Y 365, 366 (2001).
106. See Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding
California'sRestructuring
Disaster,16 J. ECON. PERSP. 191,201 (2002).
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blackout occurred, to New York and other states. Consequences were
made far worse for areas like New York City due to both public and
private failures to expand transmission facilities over several decades.
These failures were influenced by regulatory decisions as much as by
deregulation itself. As one author observes, "Electricity consumption
increased by 35 percent in the 1990s alone (and is twice the level of
the early 1970s), with transmission carrying capacity increasing by
only 10 percent."' 7
Private utilities---owning both transmission, a natural monopoly
network, and generation, which is competitive-frequently resist the
expansion of transmission where it is not in the interest of their profits,
and the regulatory process has failed to create adequate incentives to
expand this crucial network facility against the will of this strong
private interest group. Their influence is magnified, perhaps even
masked, by environmental interest groups, who are allied with
powerful incumbent firms in favoring state and local regulation of the
industry. For example, the state of Connecticut strongly opposed the
Cross-Sound Cable, a twenty-three-mile merchant transmission line
that would allow Long Island Power Authority to import power from
New Haven, Connecticut. Connecticut regulators cited environmental
concerns in support of their opposition to the project, such as impacts
on shellfish beds and dredging operations into the New Haven Harbor,
but the project complied with all state siting and environmental
statutes. Backed by environmental interest groups and a major
incumbent utility serving Connecticut customers (Northeast Utilities,
which owns an older, parallel transmission line), Connecticut's
Attorney General threatened litigation if the Cross-Sound line was
allowed to go live, delaying the project's operation for several years.' 8
As electric power transmission illustrates, the behavior of private
stakeholders is not only relevant in the market sphere, but also to the
regulatory process that implements the constitutive governance of
deregulated markets. And, as in the case of California's deregulation
plan, prior to the 2003 blackout, interactions between governments
were a major impediment to the expansion of transmission.
Longstanding jurisdictional conflicts and gaps left both state and
federal regulators unable to take action to expand transmission.
With deregulation, new coalitions are clearly influencing
governmental policies, providing a fertile ground for how even pro107. Sillin, supm note 90, at 30-3 1.
108. Bruce W Radford, Cross-Sound Cable Puts Feds on the Spot, FORT.
2004, at 2.
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competition policies are motivated by interest group behavior.
California illustrates how industrial consumers can join other
consumers and new entrants to advocate for competition. State
opposition to new transmission lines illustrates how environmental
groups and incumbent utilities may join forces to oppose new
infrastructure. Study of emerging new political coalitions in energy
industries by public choice theorists holds some promise to shed light
on the approach and success (or failure) of new deregulatory policies.
It also will hold important implications for climate change. Cap
and trade approaches to carbon emissions regulation recognize the
advantages of tradable allowances in allowing market mechanisms to
work with broader emissions mandates. Ideally, this will allow
flexibility and efficiency in complying with governmental mandates.
However, the European approach to cap and trade is largely seen as a
failure, given that powerful interest groups were able to lobby for
exceptions. °9 As Congress is considering approaches to limit carbon
emissions, such as cap and trade, it must be recognized that there is a
need to protect against interest group manipulation of trading rules.
Assigning such a program to an independent agency such as FERC,
rather than EPA, could have important advantages.
C

New Challengesfor PublicLaw m EnergyMarkets

Since the prevailing regime at both the federal and state level is a
mixture of markets and regulation, public law remains relevant to the
operation of new energy markets. Public choice theory also provides
important insights for public law as it confronts the many issues
presented by restructured energy markets. Two cutting edge issues for
further public choice study include the potential abuse of the filed rate
doctrine by private firms to manipulate regulatory enforcement in
deregulated markets and the role of the dormant commerce clause in
restoring a reciprocal balance in the imposition of state regulation.
1.

Filed Rate Doctrine

Under the longstanding filed rate doctrine, courts refuse to
adjudicate antitrust, contract and other private claims in instances
where a firm has an approved rate, known as a "tariff," on file with a
federal or state regulator. For example, rate regulated utilities routinely
109. James Kanter & Jad Mouawad, Pipe Dreams andProfits,N.Y TIMES, Dec. 11,
2008, at B I (describing successful efforts by European lobbyists to exempt many polluters
from cap and trade requirements).
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filed their rates with state and federal regulators, and following
evaluation of the actual cost of service these are routinely approved by
regulators. Under the filed rate doctrine, a utility with a filed rate is
prohibited from offering customers rebates and discounts that are at
odds with the filed tariff, which historically reflected a regulator's
careful evaluation and affirmative approval of costs and prices.'
Under traditional cost of service regulation, there was some
suspicion that energy utilities may have manipulated their rate filings
to their strategic advantage. For example, rate-regulated firms may
have requested more than they actually needed to cover their costs of
operation; by manipulating the timing of their requests in response to
agency workloads and other political factors that influence the
likelihood of approval,"' they used the rate filing process to their
advantage even under cost of service regulation. With competitive
restructuring of utilities, in which markets rather than regulators will
be the primary determinants of the price of power supply, it has been
observed that applying the filed rate doctrine to preclude antitrust
enforcement and other legal claims is akin to pounding "a square peg
into a round hole.""' 2 However, as industries such as electric power and
telecommunications have been competitively restructured, courts have
continued to heed the filed rate doctrine, refusing to address the merits
of many contract, tort, and antitrust claims against firms in newly
restructured energy markets.
One of the cases that illustrates the broad scope-and potential
cost-of the filed rate doctrine for the operation of deregulated energy
markets involved a price squeeze claim by a municipal utility in
Massachusetts against New England Power Company, alleging, among
other claims, that the defendant offered the city's affiliates preferential
treatment as customers over Norwood."' FERC had purportedly
approved these terms as "just and reasonable" as a part of New
England Power Company's restructuring plan, which included approval
of market-based tariffs; since both tariffs were on file with FERC, the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit invoked the filed
rate doctrine as a complete bar to the price squeeze claim. As the court
110. The leading case in establishing the filed rate doctrine is Keogh Y.Chicago &
NorthwestRailway Co., 260 U.S. 156, 161-65 (1922).
111. Heather E. Campbell, The Politics ofRequesting. Stategic BehaviorandPublic
UdlityReguatiorA 15 J.POLYANALYSIS & MGMT. 395,408-09 (1996).
112. Richard Stavros, Lost in Translation: Critics Say FERCS FiledRate DoctrineIs
Wrong for the Tines, 142 PUB. UTm. FORT. 4, 7 (2004).
113. See Town of Norwood v. New England Power Co., 202 F3d 408, 418 (lst Cir.
2000).
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reasoned, "It is the filing of the tariffs, and not any affirmative
approval or scrutiny by the agency, that triggers the filed rate
doctrine.""' Because "the rationale for the filed rate doctrine is to
protect the exclusive authority of the agency to accept or challenge
such tariffs,""' the First Circuit concluded that "this is not a case that
calls out for revisiting the filed rate doctrine or for strenuous efforts to
carve out exceptions.""6
Federal courts continue to endorse the filed rate shield vigorously,
keeping competitor and consumer claims almost completely out of the
hands of both state regulators and federal courts."7 For example,
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the filed
tariff doctrine to imply federal preemption of the California governor's
effort to protect consumers against strategic manipulation of its
deregulated power market."8 In the court's view, "interstate power
rates filed with FERC ...must be given binding effect" by state
regulators, even when regulating in areas subject to state jurisdiction."'
Thus, the court stated with a sweeping confidence, "FERC-approved
120
rates preempt conflicting regulations adopted by the States."
Public choice themes reveal how the filed rate doctrine not only
influences the course of litigation after a tariff has been filed with
regulators, but also creates incentives that can influence the private
behavior of regulated firms in interacting with regulators before
litigation commences. Specifically, by encouraging strategic filing of
tariffs with regulators to preempt litigation, the filed rate doctrine may
encourage a type of forum-shopping behavior by private firms in the
regulatory process before actual litigation commences. 121
Institutionally, agencies and courts have never been effective at
monitoring the process of filing rates and other tariffs as a private
forum-shopping strategy. Although many question the effectiveness of
rate regulation, this may have been a moderately stable state of affairs
with cost of service regulation, given routine regulatory proceedings
that served as some safeguard for public values. However, with the
114. Id.at 419.
115. Id. at 420 (citing Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1981)).
116. Idat421.
117. Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tatiff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a
DeregulatoryErv,56 VAND. L. REv. 1591, 1638 (2003).
118. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F3d 1042, 1058 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962 (1986)).
119. Id.
120. Id at 1056 (citing NantahalaPower& Light 476 U.S. at 962, 966).
121. Rossi, supra note 117, at 1596.
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introduction of competition to formerly regulated industries and other
regulatory transitions, market norms are emerging to expose a gap in
regulatory agency ability to deter wrongdoing by private firms. To the
extent the filed rate doctrine encourages strategic manipulation of the
tariff'rag process to foreclose judicial enforcement, it widens this gap
and may even result in more radical deregulation than either Congress
or agencies intend: essential firms may be able to elect to operate in
markets without any antitrust, contract and tort protections.
Political scientists and economists have begun to analyze how
interest groups, including regulated firms, decide to allocate their
resources regulation, congressional, agency, or judicial.'22 Because it
has unique implications for the behavior of regulated firms, the filed
rate doctrine is a worthy candidate for similar analysis. Because the
doctrine is only available on a widespread basis if a utility has filed its
tariff with federal regulators, the doctrine creates a strong ex ante
incentive for private firms, such as regulated utilities, to invest more
heavily than otherwise in lobbying regulators to accept or approve
tariffs. By engaging in such conduct ex ante, private firms can avoid
the uncertainty of an ex post judicial proceeding in which courts
enforce antitrust, tort, or contract law. The doctrine thus encourages a
type of forum shopping, triggered primarily by private decisions to
provide information in the regulatory process. If a private firm desires
the protection of the filed tariff shield-immunity from antitrust and
state common law suits for its market behavior-it has a strong
incentive to divulge information (especially ambiguous information) to
regulators ex ante, in anticipation that this information will be included
in published tariffs and will minimize unpredictable, ex post judicial
meddling.'23 Where there is no check on the accuracy, clarity and
relevance of the information firms are submitting in the regulatory
process with tariff filings, opportunities for manipulation of
regulation-and in particular institutional choice-are presented.2 4 To
the extent regulated firms engage in strategic conduct ex ante, an
122. See John M. de Figueiredo & Rui J.E de Figueiredo, Jr., The Allocation of
Resources by Interest Groups. Lobbying,LitigationandAdmimstrativeRegulation,4 Bus. &
POL. 161 (2002); Paul H. Rubin et al., Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by
Rent Seekers, 107 PUB. CHOICE 295 (2001).

123. SeeRossi, supranote 117, at 1617.
124. Using more formal modeling, commentators warn of similar behavior in other
information-disclosure contexts, such as intellectual property licensing (see Douglas
Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, StrategicDisclosurein the PatentSystem 1 (U. Chi. L.
& Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 107, 2000), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-243414)
or drug approval and merger applications (Tracy Lewis & Michael Poitevin, Disclosure of
Information in RegulatoryProceedings,13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 50 (1997)).
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institutional bias in favor of regulatory agencies-and away from
courts and markets-is likely to result.
In the context of asymmetric information disclosure of
nonverifiable information in contractual bargaining, Eric Talley has
observed a need for judicial monitoring or verification. ' Typically,
the balance between disclosure on the one hand, and institutional
decisions to regulate on the other, is monitored by the oversight of a
third party who has the ability to protect the public interest. For
example, in the context of tort litigation, securities regulation, and
witness immunity from criminal prosecution, each of which use
information disclosure to influence regulatory choices, third party
oversight plays an important role in monitoring the divulgence of
information to ensure that the choice is welfare-enhancing. In the
context of many price-regulated industries, however, third-party
monitoring of strategic disclosure is ineffective.
Third-party
monitoring of information disclosure in utility regulation would
depend on the actions of either regulators, as in the context of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or courts, as in the
context of criminal immunity. To the extent that the filed rate doctrine
applies, however, both regulators and courts have been ineffective at
policing this balance ex ante to ensure that the application of the shield
is not harmful to social welfare ex post in the utility regulation context.
As regulators have moved towards restructured markets, and
away from cost of service regulation, agencies have tended to
acquiesce in, rather than seriously scrutinize or refuse, tariff filings. In
fact, filed tariffs often become effective by operation of law after the
passage of time, with little or no scrutiny by agencies. So the filed
tariff bar curiously aligns the incentives of both private firms and
regulators to include as many terms and conditions as possible in
tariffs-even when these terms and conditions are a sham, in the sense
that agencies often lack the power to enforce them seriously. This is
not as much of a problem with cost of service regulation, because
tariffs are subject to potential adjudication in a hearing. With
restructuring, however, tariffs are frequently accepted without such
scrutiny, presenting the potential for a new kind of private
manipulation of the regulatory process.'26 Given the principles of
deference courts have provided to regulators in the late twentieth
125.

Eric Talley, DisclosureNorms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1955, 1993 (2001).

126. As is noted below, in many instances statutory limits on a regulatory agency's
jurisdiction further limit the ability of agency evaluation of tariffs to serve as a safeguard on
the forum effects of disclosure in private tariffmg.
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century,'" the judiciary has played a very small role in policing private
behavior in the tariffing process and its relationship to the filed tariff
shield.
There are two possible solutions to this problem. One is for
agencies to take a more rigorous role in evaluating and enforcing
tariffs in competitively restructured energy markets, although this is a
solution that may require congressional action to enhance the authority
of agencies and to boost their enforcement budgets. Alternatively, in
evaluating the filed rate defense in antitrust and other legal
proceedings involving deregulated firms, courts should more
effectively monitor the application of the filed rate doctrine to
determine whether an agency has meaningfully reviewed the tariffs at
issue.'28 Such review becomes increasingly important as the number
and range of suppliers increases, as is expected with significant new
investment in renewable supply of electricity.
2.

Skepticism About New Forms of Anticompetitive State
Regulation

With competitive restructuring of' industries such as electric
power and natural gas in the United States, jurisdictional tensions
between federal and state regulation have increasingly arisen. In the
context of electric power, federal regulators have unabashedly
embraced a pro-competitive approach to the wholesale power supply
market. Some states, such as Texas, have deregulatory policies with
respect to the retail market, but others such as Florida remain highly
regulated. Today the approach of states (which have substantial
jurisdiction over retail transactions) is probably best described as a
patchwork of different solutions. Previously, any tension between
federal and state regulation (and between individual states) was largely
hidden, as firms frequently operated within the jurisdiction of a given
state, and state and federal regulatory policies were consistent, but
deregulation of wholesale power supply markets brings it to the fore
with a divergence of approaches among states.
One particularly important challenge deregulated energy markets
present to state and local governments is how state siting statutes
(which provide some state process for approval of new power plants
and transmission lines) will coexist with competitive national
127. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled JudicialReview of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1443, 1464-69 (2005); Goldsmith, supr note 51, at 256; Pierce,
supranote 47, at 2032.
128. Rossi, supranote 117, at 1596.
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wholesale markets in electric power. Another difficult issue is state
renewable portfolio standards, which are sometimes combined with
renewable credits, allowing a supplier that produces more renewable
power than they need to meet the standard to sell credits and firms that
produce less than they need to purchase renewable power credits.
Operationally, such credits can be sold and purchased on a market, but
the kinds of power supply that qualify for credits currently vary
substantially from state to state. States and localities providing
favorable treatment to their indigenous forms of generating renewable
power, primarily for purposes of encouraging economic development
of this sector of the economy, may subsidize their local firms at a
greater level than out-of-state firms.
Public choice provides a useful framework to help courts
determine when state regulation thwarts the interstate market. Many
have suggested that the neoclassical account of the dormant commerce
clause-as a legal source of free trade policies between the states-is
flawed. 9 An alternative view understands the dormant commerce
clause not as inherently protecting competition itself, let alone free
markets, but as protecting a political process that makes markets
possible. For instance, in West Lynn Creamery Inc. v Healy, the
Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts tax and rebate scheme
for milk, even where the tax operated neutrally without regard to the
milk's place of origin, but where tax revenue went into a subsidy fund
and was distributed solely to Massachusetts milk producers.'3° In
writing for the majority, Justice Stevens embraced a political process
account of the dormant commerce clause. As Justice Stevens
remarked in striking down the tax and subsidy regime in West Lynn
Creamery.
Nondiscriminatory measures, like the evenhanded tax at issue here, are
generally upheld, in spite of any adverse effects on interstate commerce,
in part because "the existence of major in-state interests adversely
affected ... is a powerful safeguard against legislative abuse."
However, when a nondiscriminatory tax is coupled with a subsidy to
one of the groups hurt by the tax, a State's political processes can no
longer be relied upon to prevent legislative abuse, because one of the in-

129. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause To Resg 91 YALE L.J.
425 (1982); Steven G. Gey, The PoliticalEconomy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1989-90); Paul E. McGreal, The FlawedEconomics ofthe
DormantCommerce Clause,39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (1998).
130. W Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 188 (1994).
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state interests which would otherwise lobby against the tax has been
mollified by the subsidy.'
Rather than inherently protecting competition and free markets, the
purposes of dormant commerce clause doctrine can be understood
within the framework of Madisonian democracy as well as
efficiency-specifically, limiting welfare reducing interest group rent
seeking in the state regulatory process.
This account of the dormant commerce clause is consistent with
public choice insights. The compact clause of the Constitution
prevents states from entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements
absent congressional approval.'32 Even absent formal agreement under
the compact clause, states may informally undertake a coordinated
pro-commerce regime. In this scenario, a single state-or powerful
interest groups within a single state-may seek to appropriate rents by
enacting legislation that is intended to defeat the coordinated regime.
Individual state defectors can cause a divergence between ex ante and
ex post expectations in maintaining the implicit contractual norm of
market exchange between the states.
Drawing from this basic account of interstate coordination, Paul
McGreal has argued that the dormant commerce clause is best
understood as a solution to a defection prisoner's dilemma, where
individual states (as well as the interest groups that demand state
regulation) stand to gain by defecting rather than cooperating with
market exchange norms.'33 Maxwell Steams takes this argument a step

further, presenting the coordinated norm of competition as a type of
Nash equilibrium; this explains why only certain kinds of rent seeking
are condemned under the dormant commerce clause.'' As he argues,
an individual state's effort to enact regulations, tariffs, or subsidies that
are designed to appropriate the gains of the pro-commerce regime is
not consistent with a Nash equilibrium. A court striking state
legislation under the dormant commerce clause "facilitates a benign
multiple Nash equilibrium game, one that presumptively takes
strategies inducing a mixed-strategy equilibrium outcome off the table,
but that also effectively ratifies the choice of the early movants
131. Id.at 200 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 499 U.S. 456,473 n.17
(1981), and other cases) (citation omitted).
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress
... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.").
133. See McGreal, supra note 129, at 1200-01.
134. Maxwell L. Steams, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of the
Dormant Commerce ClauseDoctrine,45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 11-12 (2003).
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followed by other states."' 35 The Supreme Court's dormant commerce
clause jurisprudence values commonality in market norms between the
states over any individual state's particular regulatory choice. As
Maxwell L. Steams notes:
In effect the Court tells the state whose law is under review that while
the states are free to choose any of two or more available pure Nash
equilibrium outcomes, individual states are not free, after a common
regime is in place, to supplant other states' pure Nash equilibrium
outcome with a mixed-strategy equilibrium, at least absent a sufficient
demonstration that the nonconforming state's
motivation is other than to
136
disrupt a pure Nash equilibrium strategy.
Unlike the much-caricatured public choice critique, which
condemns all state and local rent-seeking as capture of regulation, the
political process account of the dormant commerce clause targets only
those rent-seeking laws that restrain commerce pursuant to implicit or
explicit norms between other states. The state political process allows
states, like Congress, to adopt rent-seeking legislation, in the form of
regulation, subsidies, and taxes. However, an individual state cannot
enact a law that undermines a desirable pro-commerce regime that has
been put into place through the implicit or explicit cooperation of
states, any more than it can undermine a pro-commerce regime
adopted formally by Congress or a federal agency (under the
preemption clause).
As an illustration, in the context of deregulated wholesale power
markets individual states frequently face strong incentives to defect in
order to protect firms in their own internal market, such as local
utilities. Several states have adopted moratoria on exempt wholesale
generators, or have limited the siting of such plants to in-state utilities
only. Florida's Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted a state
power plant siting statute to limit plant siting to those suppliers who
are Florida utilities or who have contracts with Florida utilities.'37
Effectively, this has prevented merchant power plants from siting in
Florida for purposes of entering the interstate market. Perhaps taking a
cue from Florida's success in blocking the development of new
wholesale power plants that do not directly serve in-state customers,
135. Id.at 12 (footnote omitted).
136. Id.
137. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (holding that state's
power plant siting statute "was not intended to authorize the determination of need for a
proposed power plant output that is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who
purchase electrical power at retail rates").
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many other state and local governments, particularly in the
southeastern
United States, have imposed moratoria on merchant
38
plants.
States have also attempted to prohibit the siting of merchant
interstate transmission lines necessary for reliable wholesale power
supply markets. For example, Connecticut was strongly opposed to
the Cross-Sound Cable, a twenty-three-mile merchant transmission
line allowing Long Island Power Authority to import power from New
Haven, Connecticut.
Connecticut extended to two years its
moratorium on the siting of new, expanded transmission line across
Long Island Sound.'
Northeast Utilities, a major investor-owned
utility whose customers reside primarily in Connecticut (and which
also services customers in Massachusetts and New Hampshire), owns
an older, competing transmission line that runs parallel to the CrossSound Cable and supports expanding that facility over the new
transmission line.
Connecticut's Attorney General, backed by
environmental interest groups and Northeast Utilities, threatened
litigation, instead favoring expansion of the existing transmission
line.'
Eventually, this transmission line became operational, but
expansion of transmission access to locations such as New York City
would have provided important capacity, and may have helped in
absorbing some of the transmission shortages that exacerbated the
summer 2003 blackout.'4' However, to the extent transmission remains
entirely within the control of local, rather than national, regulators,
states have strong incentives to protect their own incumbent firms or
citizens, rather than supporting interstate cooperative market norms.
Only when FERC threatened to preempt the states and mandate
operation of the Cross-Sound transmission line
42 did Connecticut
operate.
to
line
the
allow
and
position
its
concede
138. Chris Deisinger, The Backlash Against Merchant Plantsandthe Need for a New
RegulatoryModel, 13 ELECTRICITY J. 51 (2000); Nervous ofNOx, Southern Govs. Put Plants
on Hol4 ELECTRICITY DAILY, Aug. 28, 2001, at 40; State Limits on Merchant Plants a
Growing Worry, GENERATION WEEK, Aug. 22, 2001, http://www.lexis.com (search "by

Source"; then click "Find a Source"; type in "Generation Week"; click "Find"; select the
"Generation Week" hyperlink; then type "state limits on merchant plants").
139. Conn. Governor Signs Moratorium on Grid Projects, Keeping Cross Sound in
Limbo, POWER MARKETS WEEK, June 30, 2003, at 31.
140. Radford, supra note 108, at 1.
141. The technical advantage to operating two transmission lines between Connecticut
and Long Island, as opposed to one, is that this would allow electric power to travel in a semicircular loop in and out of Long Island, depending on load.
142. Bruce Lambert, New York and Connecticut Agree To End Cable Dispute, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 2004, at B6.
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To be sure, some rent transfers are permissible, if not desirable, in
state and local political processes. For example, rent seeking in the
form of a neutral corporate tax exemption for utilities, or rent-seeking
in the setting of utility rates to favor industrial growth, is likely
permissible, and subject only to the safeguards of the local political
process. However, rent seeking in the form of exclusionary regulation
that limits access to the interstate market is more suspect as an
approach to regulating economic matters, especially where market
exchange is the background norm as a matter of national policy.
Florida's Supreme Court rejected a dormant commerce clause
challenge to the use of the state's restrictive power plant siting statute
to restrict the building of new plants by out-of-state suppliers,"3 but the
inadequacy of a record establishing discrimination against out-of-state
merchant suppliers may have impeded the development of this legal
argument. At a minimum, dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
would require states and localities to explain how regulatory actions
and legislation restricting power supply in the wholesale market or
transmission expansion might serve legitimate purposes, such as
environmental or consumer protection.
Another issue presenting a challenge to state regulation of energy
is the use of state action immunity as a defense to antitrust
enforcement. Paralleling the public choice account of the dormant
commerce clause, Inman and Rubinfeld argue that state action
immunity should only be invoked where regulation imposes
substantial spillover costs on out-of-state interests.'" John Shepard
Wiley proposes that courts directly address the efficiency, and in
particular the public choice, implications of state and local legislation
in deciding whether to invoke state action immunity; if anticompetitive
legislation is inefficient and the result of producer-interest lobbying,
state action immunity should not protect it from invalidation under the
Sherman Act.' 5 Also drawing on the insights of public choice,
Matthew Spitzer argues that federal courts should invalidate state or
local legislation if it is inefficient or if it transfers wealth from
consumers to producers.' 6 While public choice analysis does not
143. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428,436 (Fla. 2000).
144. Robert P Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust StateAction Doctrine: Balancing PoliticalParticipatfionand Economic Efficiency in Regulatory
Federalism,75 TEX. L. REv. 1203, 1276 (1997).
145. John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory ofAntitrust Fedemlism, 99 HAW. L.
REv. 713, 741-76 (1986).
146. Matthew L. Spitzer, AntitrustFederalisnandRationalChoice PoliticalEconomy:
A Cique of Capture Theory,61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1293, 1318 (1988).
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render all state and local regulation illegitimate in such contexts, it
does illustrate an increased skepticism towards some state and local
regulation, a skepticism that may be warranted, particularly against the
backdrop of interstate energy supply markets. While, as I have argued,
state and local regulation remains highly relevant to climate change,
public choice also suggests an important role for courts in assessing
when state and local regulation goes too far.
V

CONCLUSION

Economic themes have arisen throughout the history of U.S.
energy regulation and continue to be relevant today, particularly with
widespread discussion of deregulation and increased attention to
climate change. Public choice and attention to economic incentives
provides an account for the stability of the regulatory contract that
predominated throughout the twentieth century and its accompanying
approach to public law, which generally reflected strong judicial
deference to state and local regulators. It also helps in explaining and
understanding Congress's limited approach to national energy
legislation, which reflects a combination of federalism approaches and
logrolling responses that link energy policy to transportation,
agriculture, and other issues. As I have argued, public choice advises
interpreting ambiguity in such legislation in ways that favor
nonindustrial consumer groups and new suppliers, since these interest
groups are least likely to be involved in lobbying Congress.
Competitive restructuring of energy industries holds new promise
for markets, and one view of new competition policies is as a public
choice triumph for markets over the failures of regulation. This view is
naive, however, and public choice concerns continue to resonate even
in deregulated energy industries given the mixed market/regulation
approach that federal and state regulators have consistently embraced.
As long as the policy choice to develop new energy markets is within
the hands of governmental decision makers, private efforts to influence
government can predominate over economic efficiency and public
choice themes will remain relevant to the regulation of energy,
including issues of climate change.
Indeed, as Congress begins to address climate change explicitly,
political economy themes will become more important than ever.
Congress cannot successfully address climate change through the
adoption of regulatory mandates or piecemeal approaches that fail to
confront basic economic incentives in the electric power industry.
Doing so will almost certainly undermine regulatory goals. Many
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important issues will be addressed by Congress, but an understanding
of the economic structure of the industry highlights five issues that
must be addressed in order to successfully address climate change:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

If Congress does not expand FERC's limited authority over
transmission planning and siting, parochial state concerns will
continue to serve as a barrier to the development of new
transmission infrastructure for renewable sources of electric
power.
If the interaction between new transmission expansion for
renewable sources and deregulated wholesale markets is not
addressed in transmission cost allocation and pricing policies,
renewable sources of electric power may not have access to
transmission even where facilities are built.
If the political process surrounding cap and trade implementation
is not designed to encourage regulatory independence, such
programs could readily be designed and manipulated by powerful
carbon sources, including power plants, agriculture interests, and
industry.
The preservation of a continued role for regional, state, and local
jurisdiction on matters related to climate change, such as
renewable portfolio standards and building codes, will be
important to promoting innovation and experimentation.
Some mechanism for federal preemption of state regulatory
policies that serve primarily parochial goals will be important to
ensuring the success of national climate change policies.

Given the strength of economic incentives in the electric power
industry, any energy package that fails to address each of these five
issues will continue to present barriers to broader climate change
goals. Unless Congress wishes its climate change programs to amount
to little more than symbolic legislation, it will need to confront the
economic structure of the energy industry and the continued
challenges it presents to regulatory efforts to limit carbon emissions.
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